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Abstract 
By conducting an extensive exploration on claim data, this paper attempts to 
investigate the fraud problem in Taiwan automobile physical damage 
insurance. Based on the different claim patterns between data in calendar year 
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policy year. Censored regression provides robust estimation concerning the 
sources of the fraud payment. 
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I. Introduction 
Insurance fraud is a hot topic in insurance industry recently. In general, 
insurance fraud can be defined as an attempt to obtain compensation for the alleged 
accident that never happened or was unrelated to the accident and as an attempt on 
the part of the claimant to inflate the damages for which compensation is being 
sought. Insurance fraud could increase risk costs to raise insurance premium so that 
the consumers who demand for insurance might not be able to buy it. Although fraud 
problems mainly belong to practical issues, academic studies gradually pay attention 
to this subject because of the negative effect of fraud on insurance pricing and the 
efficiency of the insurance market. 
Numerous studies on automobile insurance fraud have been conducted since 
1990’s. For example, Weisberg and Derrig (1991, 1992, 1995, 1996) and Derrig, 
Weisberg and Chen (1994) investigate fraud and abuse in Massachusetts automobile 
insurance claims; Caron and Dionne (1999) and Dionne and Belhadji (1996) 
examined similar problems using Canadian data. Cummins and Tennyson (1992) 
found that there were significant effects of attitudes toward fraud on automobile 
liability claims. Furthermore, Carroll, Abrahamse, and Vaiana (1995), Abrahamse 
and Carroll (1998) and Carroll and Abrahamse (2001) analyzed the soft-injury claim 
patterns across the states which executed different types of insurance system to 
estimate excess claims and in the recent study they found that approximately 42% of 
reported soft-injury claims in the dollar-threshold and tort states were for nonexistent 
or preexisting injuries. Other papers such as Derrig and Ostaszewski (1995), 
Weisberg and Derrig (1998) and Brockett et al., (1998) try to develop proper 
techniques identifying fraudulent claims or doing fraud classification. Moreover, 
Moreno et al. (2006) demonstrated that bonus-malus contracts might be able to 
contain an incentive against fraud.  
Using a unique data set, this paper attempts to investigate the fraud problem in 
Taiwan by econometric analysis and to provide robust estimation of the magnitude of 
fraud payment. Since excess or fraud claims are not easy to observe directly, we will 
use data exploration and econometric model to identify excess claims. The focus of 
this study is on the variability of claim frequency (and payment) for various 
automobile insurance policies. The major hypothesis testing would base on the 
difference of claim pattern between calendar year and policy year. 
Theoretically, claim frequencies or payments of automobile physical loss are 
supposed to distribute evenly in every month. If plot claim data by calendar month 
on a diagram, we would expect to see little difference among months for a specific 
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year. However, the sale of automobile insurance policy in Taiwan heavily relies on 
agents associated with car dealer. As a common custom, some insurance agents 
would encourage policyholders to file a claim that does not actually occur just before 
the end of insurance policy. In this way, the covered car might get new paint or 
unnecessary repair with new parts. Although Taiwan adopts bonus-malus system in 
automobile insurance market, policyholders would obtain higher claim coefficient 
and hence pay high premium for the next policy year, a large portion of the insured 
still do not care or even do not know (never told) exactly how the system works. 
Therefore there is incentive for agents to take advantage of insurer to increase the 
revenue of auto shops. Based on the process described above, we would expect a 
high peak of claim frequency appeared in the last month of policy year.  
In Taiwan, there are three major types of coverage for vehicle damage insurance: 
comprehensive form A, comprehensive form B, and moving collision coverage (form 
C). The comprehensive form A policy, sold with compulsory increasing per-claim 
deductibles, covers all perils. Comprehensive form B policy, sold with increasing 
per-claim deductibles or zero deductible, covers the same risks as form A but 
excludes vandalism and unknown perils. The moving collision policy, sold with no 
deductibles, covers only two cars collision peril. 
Compared with the transaction costs to file an excess claim for various form of 
insurance coverage, we would expect moving collision coverage (form C) to have 
less incentive because two cars collision is needed. Among all the forms, 
Comprehensive form B without deductible contains the highest incentive for the 
insured to file fraud claims.  
After data illustration, the study will perform the regression analysis by 
following the methodology in Dionne and Gagne (2001). The key issue is that for 
various coverage and deductibles, the reservation amounts of filing a claim are 
different. This creates data censored problem. As proposed in Dionne and Gagne 
(2001), the modified method by Nelson(1977), Maddala(1983) will be used. 
In the next section, we briefly interpret the dataset and explore the claim data. 
Section 3 illustrates methodology we adopt including empirical models and variables. 
Empirical estimations are conducted in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes this 
research. 
II. Data Exploration 
The data used in this study are unique. We obtained the data sets that contain 
entire private automobile vehicle damage insurance policies and claims in Taiwan for 
years 2003 to 2005. Through merging the data sets of policy and claim, we search 
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out the whole claim data for policy years 2003 and 2004. The data sets, including the 
characteristics of policyholder, vehicle, claim driver and contract types, are provided 
by Taiwan Insurance Institute, a semi-official organization responsible for publishing 
insurance statistics and financial data of insurers. 
A first look of the data confirms our hypothesis of fraudulent claims. Figure 1 
and figure 2 show that four different forms of contract have similar claim frequencies 
and payments (about 7-10%) at various calendar months. However, if we plot the 
claim frequencies and payments in terms of policy month in Figure 3 and 4 
respectively, there are significantly high peaks (from 20% to 40%) appeared in the 
last policy months. Among them, as expected, form C policy has the lowest claim 
ratio while form B policy with no deductible has highest claim ratio in the last month 
of policy year.  
[Insert Fig. 1 to Fig. 4] 
We use the nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon tests to compare 
the claim ratios in the last policy month with that of other policy months. Table 1 
confirms that the ratios of claim frequency in the last policy month are significantly 
different from that in other policy months for all types of coverage. As far as the 
claim payment is concern, as Table 2 shows, claim ratios of payment are 
significantly higher in the last policy month than in other policy months except for 
form C policy. Therefore we can reject the null hypothesis that claim ratios in the last 
policy month have the same distribution as in the other policy months. 
[Insert Table 1, Table 2] 
Due to the largest difference of claim ratios between the last month and other 
policy month, we would specially focus on form B policy in this study.  
However, the abnormal claims might be caused by the bonus hunger behavior, 
indicating that consumers report one accident only after accumulating several small 
losses to reduce transaction costs and to avoid negative influence on driving record. 
Hence we check the claims pattern of those cases having more than two claims in 
one policy year. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon tests cannot reject the 
hypotheses that the claim patterns are the same for different claim frequency in one 
policy year. Moreover, we find that the average claim payment per claim is relatively 
lower in the last policy month. To further check up the difference of average claim 
amount between the last policy month and other policy months, we confirms that 
average claim amount between the last policy month and other policy months are 
significantly diverse.  
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III. Methodology and Variables 
In this section, we analyze the behavior of insurance fraud on form B policy. 
Firstly, our objective is to identify the characteristics of automobile insurance 
policies that might induce excess claims in the last policy month. PROBIT model is 
used to estimate the effect of insured factors on dependent variable, a binary variable 
indicating the occurrence of claim filed in the last policy month. The empirical 
model may be expressed as 
Prob.（Clm12i＝1）＝α’ Xi + µi                                  (1) 
where Clm12i is a dummy variable that equals 1 if individual i filed a claim in the 
last policy month and 0 otherwise; Xi is a vector of regressors; α’ is a vector of 
parameters; µi is a disturbance in our setup. 
The following variables are used in our model (the subscript i is omitted): 
District 1-District22: a set of dummy variables taking the value 1 if the 
automobile is registered in j district, j = 1,2,…,22, and 0 otherwise. 
Company 1- Company 16: a set of dummy variables taking the value 1 if the 
policy is from insurance company j, j = 1,2,…,16, and otherwise. 
Exhaust: cubic capacity of the automobile with an incremental unit of 1,000cc. 
Clmcoef: the claim coefficient, an indicator of past driving record. 
Car_age: the age of the insured automobile in years. 
Dr_age: the age of the driver who filed a claim. 
Dr_female: a dummy variable that equals 1 if the driver is female and 0 
otherwise. 
Dr_married: a dummy variable that equals 1 if the driver is married, and 0 
otherwise. 
Identical: a dummy variable that equals 1 if the driver is the same as 
policyholder, and 0 otherwise. 
Renew: a dummy variable that equals 1 if the policy renews in the same 
insurance company next policy year and 0 otherwise. We don’t consider 
whether the policy renews in the same form. 
Poyr03: a dummy variable that equals 1 if the claim is in 2003 policy year, and 
0 otherwise. 
Deductible: a dummy variable that equals 1 if the policy is with deductible and 
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0 otherwise. There are several types of deductible. Considering the 
consistence of coverage and large samples, we exclude other types of 
deductibles except increasing per-claim deductible. 
Table 3 and 4 depict the descriptive statistics of the data. When analyzing claim 
data on form B policy with both deductible and no deductible, we eliminate the 
policies with straight deductible and just retain those with increasing per-claim 
deductibles for consistency in coverage. Increasing per-claim deductibles are NT$ 
3000, 5000, and 7000 respectively. It is worth noting that the figures in Table 4 do 
not reveal the true gender distribution. The proportions of males in form B policy 
with no deductible and deductible are 55.89% and 60.53%, but the proportions of 
male drivers in claim data are 29.49% and 37.00% respectively, indirect testimonial 
to the fact that most automobile insurance policies are purchased under the name of a 
female family member. This phenomenon is easily explained by the difference in 
gender coefficients for males and females. The nature of this phenomenon is 
confirmed through the variables of Dr_married and Identical in Table 4, which 
shows more than 75% of claim drivers are married and less than 50% of claim 
drivers are the same person as policyholder in all categories. This is lead to the fact 
that for a given age, males have a higher pricing coefficient than females. 
Furthermore, average car age is close to zero, representing that most automobiles are 
new. 
[Insert Table 3, 4] 
IV. Empirical Results 
In PROBIT regression approach, the estimated results are presented in Table 5. 
We run three different subsets, namely form B with no deductible, form B with 
deductible and, form B (coverage bias corrected) to understand whether there exist 
different effects for varied coverage. 
[Insert Table 5, 6] 
When considering the individual characteristics of the drivers, it seems that 
three variables, Dr_age, Dr_female and Identical, play important role in explaining 
the claim behavior in the last policy month. The coefficient of drivers’ age is 
significantly positive. Under the same condition, the increase of driver’s age could 
raise the possibility of claim filed in the last policy month. Cohen (2005) tested the 
predictions of adverse-selection models using data from automobile insurance market 
in Israel and found that a positive coverage-accidents correlation exists only for 
policyholders with enough years of driving experience, consistent with the possibility 
of policyholders’ learning about their risk type. In light of the similar finding, older 
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drivers might have enough experience to collude with car dealers. 
Although the proportion of the male driver is higher as described above, car 
dealers might use policyholders’ information to file claims in the last policy month 
for operational convenience. Therefore the probability of female drivers filing claims 
in the last policy month could increase obviously, supporting our conjecture. On the 
other hand, the probability of the drivers who are the same as policyholders filing 
claims in the last month of policy year significantly increases on form B policy with 
no deductible, consistent with the argument of operational convenience. We further 
take into account interaction term between Dr_female and Identical in the 
specification, and the result shows that the probability of the last policy month claims 
filed by the female drivers who are the same as policyholders statistically 
significantly increases.1 Therefore, all of these results consistently support our 
inference providing the indirect evidence of insurance fraud in the last month of 
policy year. 
The factors of car type are measured by car age (Car_age) and cubic capacity of 
the automobile (Exhaust). The coefficient of car age is significantly negative in all 
regression models, representing that the newer cars would probably easy to have 
accidents in the last policy month. As Table 3 shows, most cars are new and the 
owners of new car would usually buy physical damage insurance policies. In the case 
of collusion, the result is reasonable. On the other hand, the results imply that the 
policyholders with new car whose claim coefficient could almost be zero would have 
more incentives to defraud. Regarding the variable of Exhaust, the coefficients of all 
data sets are significantly negative. The automobiles with larger displacement are 
usually more expensive and could denote the wealth of the car owners. Hence, we 
may conclude that wealthy people have less incentive to file claims in the last policy 
month.  
Moreover, the features of contract are taken into account with Clmcoef, Renew 
and Deductible. Claim coefficient is calculated from claim reports in the past three 
years and hence may indicate the risk type of policyholder. We find that the 
probability of claim is positively correlated with claim coefficient but the probability 
of the claim filed in the last policy month is negatively correlated with claim 
coefficient.2 The policyholders who have higher bonus-malus coefficient are high 
                                                 
1 The coefficients associated with Dr_female on form B policy with no deductible, form B policy 
with deductible and form B policy corrected coverage bias when Identical = 1 are 0.0748, 0.0541 
and 0.0683 with standard error 0.0074, 0.0164 and 0.0068 respectively. Therefore, they are 
significantly different from zero at 1% confidence level. 
2 We run the PROBIT model and consider dependent variable, a binary variable indicating the 
occurrence of the fact that at least one claim is filed during the contract. The estimated result is 
showed in Table 6. 
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risk drivers and have ever filed claims before. For this reason, past claims might have 
satisfied the policyholders’ need with loss indemnity, hence they have less incentive 
to deceive in the last policy month. Although bonus-malus system might be able to 
contain an incentive against fraud in theory, in the case of new car, policyholder’s 
claim coefficient is usually zero, and one claim in policy year has no effect on raising 
claim coefficient. In addition, most of the policyholders who file one claim only in a 
policy year would be advantageous compared with opportunity cost. Therefore, the 
policies with lower claim coefficient would have higher probability to file a claim. 
The regression results also reveal the fact that the contracts renewed in the same 
company in the next policy year would also have higher probability to file claim in 
the last policy month. The intuition behind this phenomenon is the competition in the 
automobile insurance market. Car agents might compete each other by providing 
better service in terms of encouraging fraud claim in the last month of policy year to 
attract policyholders renew their contracts and then gain the commissions in the next 
year. 
Due to the fact that most consumers prefer automobile insurance policies of 
form B with no deductible, we may conclude that the probability of claim filed in the 
last policy month significantly decline if the policy is with deductible from the result 
on form B policy corrected coverage bias.  
Finally, most of the coefficients associated with the district in which the 
automobile is insured are not significant, indicating that there are no differences 
among districts in terms of the drivers’ behavior. But several company effects are 
statistically significant, showing that there are significant differences in the way 
some insurers settle the claims. 
V. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to measure automobile insurance fraud in Taiwan 
insurance industry. After the exploration of automobile physical damage insurance 
claim data, we find that claim ratios of frequency and payment are significantly 
higher in the last policy month than in other policy months, especially for the form B 
policy. We consider it as a form of ex post moral hazard or opportunistic insurance 
fraud. 
The special competition environment for car dealers and automobile insurance 
companies provide the intuition of fraud claim. By offering the sale of automobile 
and automobile insurance simultaneously, car dealers have more incentives to 
collude with customers to file fraudulent claims to gain feasible interests. In this 
situation, it seems that insurers are the victims. However, honest customers are the 
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true victims and will be forced to pay higher insurance premium in the future. The 
demand for vehicle damage insurance would be affected in such situation. 
By focusing on form B policy in Taiwan automobile insurance market, we 
provide statistical analysis and find that the distributions of claim data in terms of 
policy month do contain signals of fraud behavior. Further improvement on product 
design and claim monitor system are needed. 
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Figure 1. Monthly share of total claim frequencies in 2003 and 2004 calendar years 
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Figure 2. Monthly share of total claim payments in 2003 and 2004 calendar years 
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Figure 3. Monthly share of total claim frequencies in 2003 and 2004 policy years 
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Figure 4. Monthly share of total claim payments in 2003 and 2004 policy years  
 
 
Table 1. Shift in the last policy month ratios of claim frequency  
  Form A 
Form B –  
No 
Deductible 
Form B - 
Deductible 
Form C 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test     
KSa 1.354006 1.354006 1.354006 1.354006 
P-value 0.0511 0.0511 0.0511 0.0511 
Wilcoxon Two-Sample Test     
Z 2.2461 2.2456 2.2456 2.2456 
P-value 0.0247 0.0247 0.0247 0.0247 
 
Table 2. Shift in the last policy month ratios of claim payment 
  Form A 
Form B –  
No 
Deductible 
Form B - 
Deductible 
Form C 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test     
KSa 1.354006 1.354006 1.354006 0.738549 
P-value 0.0511 0.0511 0.0511 0.6465 
Wilcoxon Two-Sample Test     
Z 2.2456 2.2456 2.2456 1.2011 
P-value 0.0247 0.0247 0.0247 0.2297 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables 
  Form B - No Deductible Form B - Deductible Form B - Coverage Bias Corrected 
 N=176345 N=40334 N=207212 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean
Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum Mean
Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Exhaust 1.86 0.63 0.50 47.07 2.09 0.83 0.60 79.05 1.88 0.66 0.50 79.05 
Clmcoef -0.06 0.15 -2.00 1.60 -0.06 0.21 -0.60 2.20 -0.06 0.16 -2.00 1.60 
Car_age 0.81 1.42 0.00 16.00 1.45 2.01 0.00 15.00 0.88 1.52 0.00 16.00 
Dr_age 36.80 10.49 18.00 90.00 38.52 10.14 18.00 90.00 37.01 10.47 18.00 90.00 
 
Table 4. Frequency of the major dummy variables 
  Form B - No Deductible Form B - Deductible Form B - Coverage Bias Corrected
 N=176345  N=40334  N=207212 
Variable Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Clm12 68,442     38.81      15,133      37.52      81,300      39.24      
Dr_female 77,770     44.10       15,918      39.47       89,975      43.42      
Dr_married 142,284     80.69       30,256      75.01       166,113      80.17      
Identical 81,658     46.31       18,235      45.21       96,044      46.35      
Renew 39,682     22.50       15,177      37.63       50,525      24.38      
Poyr03 47,017     26.66       13,984      34.67       57,678      27.84      
Deductible 0     0.00       40,334      100.00       31,755      15.32      
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Table 5. Binomial PROBIT regressions on the claim filed in the last month of policy year 
Variable Form B - No Deductible Form B - Deductible Form B - Coverage Bias Corrected
Intercept -5.4692 -5.4924 5.3825 5.3567 5.4243 5.3821 
 (567.1154)  (567.7932)  (1269.2350)  (1269.8570)  (1267.9130)  (1270.3880)  
Dr_age 0.0015 *** 0.0015 *** 0.0019 *** 0.0019 *** 0.0017 *** 0.0017 ***
 (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  
Dr_female 0.0440 *** 0.0198 ** 0.0240 * 0.0125  0.0388 *** 0.0140  
 (0.0071)  (0.0098)  (0.0146)  (0.0200)  (0.0065)  (0.0090)  
Dr_married 0.1478 *** 0.1482 *** 0.1530 *** 0.1458 *** 0.1480 *** 0.1477 ***
 (0.0094)  (0.0093)  (0.0200)  (0.0199)  (0.0086)  (0.0086)  
Car_age -0.0819 *** -0.0816 *** -0.0659 *** -0.0658 *** -0.0787 *** -0.0785 ***
 (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0037)  (0.0037)  (0.0023)  (0.0023)  
Exhaust -0.0556 *** -0.0551 *** -0.1367 *** -0.1362 *** -0.0679 *** -0.0674 ***
 (0.0056)  (0.0056)  (0.0098)  (0.0098)  (0.0051)  (0.0051)  
Clmcoef -0.1468 *** -0.1451 *** -0.1478 *** -0.1475 *** -0.1359 *** -0.1345 ***
 (0.0238)  (0.0238)  (0.0336)  (0.0336)  (0.0206)  (0.0206)  
Renew 0.0023  0.0021  0.0942 *** 0.0941 *** 0.0190 *** 0.0189 ***
 (0.0077)  (0.0077)  (0.0143)  (0.0143)  (0.0070)  (0.0070)  
Identical 0.0362 ***   0.0183    0.0336 ***   
 (0.0073)    (0.0148)    (0.0067)    
Dr_female*Identical   0.0550 ***   0.0666 ***   0.0543 ***
   (0.0107)    (0.0228)    (0.0099)  
Deductible         -0.0350 *** -0.0340 ***
         (0.0087)  (0.0087)  
Poyr03 -0.2593 *** -0.2593 *** -0.2286 *** -0.2285 *** -0.2515 *** -0.2515 ***
 (0.0077)  (0.0077)  (0.0150)  (0.0150)  (0.0070)  (0.0070)  
22 district and 16 
company dummies －  －  －  －  －  －  
Observations Used 176,345 176,345 40,334  40,334 207,212 207,212  
Log Likelihood -113049.9079   -113048.7919   -24741.8452   -24738.3533   -132698.7650   -132696.1342  
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent 
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level.
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Table 6. Binomial PROBIT regression on claim filed during contract 
Variable Form B - Coverage Bias Corrected
Intercept -0.0951  
 (0.6775)  
Age 0.0018 *** 
 (0.0002)  
Female 0.0359 *** 
 (0.0047)  
Married -0.0370 *** 
 (0.0071)  
Car_age -0.0556 *** 
 (0.0014)  
Exhaust -0.0402 *** 
 (0.0033)  
Clmcoef 0.7077 *** 
 (0.0131)  
Deductible -0.0844 *** 
 (0.0056)  
Poyr03 -0.6232 *** 
 (0.0043)  
   
23 district and 19 company 
dummies (estimates suppressed) 
－  
   
Number of observations 501,853  
   
Log Likelihood -262947.6945   
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
